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THE BEGINNING OF THE END
THE INDIAN PEACE COMMISSION OF

1867~1868

KERRY R. OMAN

In 1867, in an effort to avoid the high costs of
war and protect overland transportation
routes, Congress passed a bill authorizing a
commission to establish peace with the Plains
Indians. In less than two years, what proved to
be the last major commission sent out by the
government to treat with the Indians met and
signed treaties with the Kiowa, Comanche,
Kiowa-Apache, Northern and Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho, Crow, Navajo, Eastern
Shoshone and Bannock, and the Brule, Oglala,

Miniconjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa, Blackfeet,
Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arc, and Santee
bands of Lakota Sioux. Their efforts helped
end Red Cloud's War upon the Northern
Plains, and, as a result of their reports and
recommendations, they greatly influenced federal Indian policy. Yet, despite these accomplishments, Congress failed to quickly fulfill
the treaty stipulations, and instead of initiating an era of peace, the commission commenced a decade of war and bloodshed
throughout the Plains.!
The origins of the Peace Commission can
be traced to the early morning hours of 29
November 1864, when the Third Regiment of
Colorado Volunteers, led by the reckless Col.
John M. Chivington, massacred a friendly band
of Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians along the
banks of Sand Creek in eastern Colorado. As
military and newspaper accounts spread concerning the nature of the attack and the horrific mutilation of the bodies that followed,
several governmental agencies launched investigations into the incident. 2 One such investigation, created by Congress in March 1865,
called for a special joint committee, headed
by Sen. James R. Doolittle, to inquire into the
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condition of the Indian tribes and the actions
of the civil and military authorities of the
United States.
The "Doolittle Report," as it came to be
called, took nearly two years to complete and
contained a mass of documents over 500 pages
in length. Among its findings, the committee
described in detail the deterioration of the
Indians' condition and the causes of Indian
hostility, which they believed could largely be
traced to the "aggressions of lawless white
men." The report also condemned the actions
of Chivington at Sand Creek and called for
the creation of five boards of inspection of
Indian affairs that could annually visit the
Indian tribes within their districts in an effort
to better comprehend their conditions and
avoid future military conflicts. 3
In July 1867, while Congress brewed over
Doolittle's findings, they received a report from
another special investigating committee regarding the annihilation of Lt. William J.
Fetterman's command near Fort Phil Kearney
on 21 December 1866 and Gen. Winfield S.
Hancock's destruction of a Cheyenne and
Lakota Sioux village in April 1867. 4 Fort Phil
Kearney was one of three forts located along
the Bozeman Trail, a route that intersected
the Powder River Basin as it took miners to
the goldfields of Montana. Both the fort and
trail existed on Indian lands set aside by treaty
and were in the heart of the last remaining
hunting grounds in the Northern Plains. Along
with documenting Fetterman's loss and criticizing General Hancock's actions, the report
called for the creation of two reservations
where the Indians could be induced to take up
pastoral and agricultural pursuits. Just how this
was to be accomplished was the problem.
Lt. Gen. William T. Sherman, a grizzled
Civil War veteran and a relentless advocate of
total warfare, had his own ideas of how to deal
with the Indians. In a letter to the secretary of
war on 17 June 1867, and included in the previous report, General Sherman made it clear
that "if fifty Indians are allowed to remain
between the Arkansas and Platte we will have
to guard every stage station, every train, and

FIG. 1. General William T. Sherman, ca. 18601865. Photogapher, Mathew Brady Studio. War
Department, US Army, Office of the Chief Signal
Officer. National Archives at College Park, MD.
Photograph no. NWDNS-ll1-B-1789.

all railroad working parties. In other words,
fifty hostile Indians will checkmate three thousand soldiers." Making sure the secretary of
war understood him, he proclaimed that "it
makes little difference whether they be coaxed
out by Indian commissioners or killed," but
the government needed to get the Indians out
as soon as possible. s
As a result of the Sand Creek Massacre,
along with the impact of the Doolittle Report,
the investigation into the actions of Lieutenant Fetterman and General Hancock, and
other conflicts on the Plains, a bill proposing
a commission "to establish peace with certain
hostile Indian tribes" came before Congress
on 15 July 1867. 6 The bill called for a new
reservation scheme with the ultimate aim being the "concentration" of all Plains Indians
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onto two reservations-one lying north of the
state of Nebraska, west of the Missouri River,
and east of the routes to Montana, and another one located in a district south of the
state of Kansas and west of the state of Arkansas. 7 The removal of the Plains tribes onto
reservations was not just an effort to establish
peace, but more importantly was an attempt
to secure the safety of overland transportation
routes. Within the Senate, the bill went
through a long series of debates over a fourday period that often looked past the specifics
of the proposed Peace Commission and centered on what several senators referred to as
the "Indian question."8
In 1867 Congress faced a critical point in
the history of the country. The question raised
within the Senate was whether the government should attempt to assimilate, concentrate, or exterminate the Indians. This was an
old argument, and a highly contentious one at
that, but this time it became centered on the
high price of fighting "hostile" Indians. According to some members of Congress, it cost
the government nearly $1 million for every
Indian killed during the present campaign, and
from $1 to $2 million a week just to defend the
frontier populations. Many feared that unless
they acted quickly the current operations
would burden the treasury for nearly $100
million before the end of the year, causing the
typically soft-spoken Sen. John B. Henderson
of Missouri to stand in front of Congress and
forcefully demand that "if we can make peace
with the Indians we had better do it."9
Reaching consensus that it was better to
make peace than war, the discussion moved to
the old and highly controversial question of
assimilation. Some took the stance that assimilation was the only solution, while others
insisted that history had demonstrated the
impossibility of the two races living in harmony with one another. Sen. Samuel C.
Pomeroy of Kansas summed up many of the
senators' sentiments:
I believe, however, religiously, that the only
ultimate solution of this whole question is,
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that the Indian shall take his place among
other men and accept the march of civilization, as he must ultimately, or there is nothing except his destiny that awaits him,
which is extinction. lo
The overriding attitude centered on their insistence that the Indians not be permitted to
stand in the way of "civilization" and
"progress," or, as Senator Henderson proclaimed, if nothing but extermination would
do, then the Indian's "termination must
come."ll Congress's prevailing drive to protect the efforts of the railroad, as well as other
overland routes, enhanced their determination to remove or exterminate the Indians.
The bill, which passed both houses of Congress on 20 July 1867, called for a top-ranking
seven-man commission with the aim of establishing peace with the Plains Indians. It would
consist of four civilians and three generals, all
having a sincere interest and competence in
dealing with Indian affairs. The goal was to
establish permanent peace between the Indians and whites, and thus the bill gave the commissioners power to call together the chiefs of
those Indian tribes then considered to be waging war against the people of the United States.
The commissioners were instructed to make
treaty stipulations that could secure the overland lines of transportations, and most specifically the property of the railroad. It also
required the commissioners to select a district
or districts that, after being approved by Congress, would be sufficient to receive all the
Indian tribes not peacefully residing on permanent reservations and living east of the
R(Jcky Mountains. Congress believed the commission could accomplish peace in this territory by persuading the Indians to abandon their
nomadic lifestyles in exchange for reservation
life in which they could support themselves by
agricultural and pastoral pursuits. Finally, if
the commissioners should fail to achieve peace
and remove the Indians onto reservations, then
the act authorized the secretary of war to accept as many as 4,000 civilian volunteers to
accomplish the task through force. 12
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The first man named on the commission
was Nathaniel G. Taylor, then acting commissioner of Indian Affairs. Taylor was a
graduate of Princeton; he had served in the
House of Representatives before and after the
Civil War, and he expressed deep religious
beliefs about "civilizing" the Indians. The second civilian was the scholarly Sen. John B.
Henderson of Missouri who, as acting chairman of the Committee of Indian Affairs of
the Senate, had sponsored the bill that created the Peace Commission. Samuel F.
Tappan, a Christian crusader and former chairman of the commission created to investigate
Chivington's actions at Sand Creek, as well as
a noted supporter of Indian rights, and John
B. Sanborn comprised the third and fourth
civilian members. Sanborn, a retired army officer, had served on the commission investigating Fetterman's destruction, but at the time
practiced law in Washington. 13
In contrast, the remaining three positions
appointed by the president consisted of experienced army officers and well-known advocates of military action. Unquestionably, the
most powerful military leader was Lt. Gen.
William Tecumseh Sherman. Sherman was an
intense and influential commander of the Division of the Missouri, whose terrifyingly successful tactics during the Civil War and
outspoken support of military use demanded
respect and attention from the other members. Accompanying him was the fair-minded
ex-lawyer Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry. Standing over six feet in height, Terry was an imposing figure whose clearness of perception,
cooperative nature, and Civil War experience
had earned him respect throughout the military.14 The third military officer called was
retired Gen. William S. Harney, an experienced, well-respected commander who had
made many friends and enemies among the
Indians and currently had his home in St.
Louis. 1s
The commission first met in St. Louis on 6
August 1867. They selected the pro-Indian
civilian Nathaniel G. Taylor as president and
immediately began discussing how they would

gather the chiefs and leading warriors of the
tribes. Taking advantage of the civil and military power possessed by those on the commission, General Sherman sent out orders to the
commanders of the various military posts,
while Commissioner Taylor instructed the
superintendents and agents under his charge
to gather the Indians together: those in the
northern section were to meet at Fort Laramie
on 13 September, and those in the south were
to meet near Fort Larned, Kansas, around 13
October. As they waited, the commissioners
resolved to charter a steamer and examine the
country along the upper Missouri for a suitable reservation. During this time, the commissioners also met with military, governmental,
and civilian authorities at Fort Leavenworth,
inquiring into the present condition of the
Indians and discussing the overall purpose of
the commission. 16
Low water hampered their progress up the
Missouri River; consequently, just above the
mouth of the Cheyenne River they decided to
return in order to reach Fort Laramie by the
desired time. On the return trip the commissioners held short councils with many of the
bands then living along the Missouri. It was
the experienced opinion of the Peace Commission after meeting with and viewing the
condition of these tribes that many of the treaty
stipulations then in force were altogether inappropriate. They felt the treaties had been
"made in total ignorance of [the tribes'] numbers and disposition, and in utter disregard of
their wants." It was also the commissioners'
opinion that several of the agents needed to
be removed and replaced by honest, fair-dealing men who would be able to secure respect
and confidence from the Indians. Inappropriate treaty stipulations, broken promises by the
government, and dishonest agents were just
some of the concerns raised in the earlier reports on the conditions of the Indian tribesall problems that Congress had discussed and
hoped that the current Peace Commission
could remedy.17
Arriving in Omaha on 11 September 1867,
the commissioners immediately proceeded up
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the Platte River on the Union Pacific railroad. In the vicinity of North Platte, Nebraska,
they met a considerable number of Lakota
Sioux and Northern Cheyenne. Unfortunately, most of these people were with Spotted Tail, a chief of the Brule Sioux noted for
his friendship toward whites. Even more discouraging was information that there was little
hope in persuading Red Cloud, one of the most
courageous and formidable Indian leaders on
the Northern Plains, and his followers to attend the council. With unbridled skill as a
warrior, orator, and diplomatic negotiator, Red
Cloud had emerged as the leader in the opposition to white encroachment on Lakota Sioux
lands, particularly against the three forts built
along the Bozeman Trail. These northern
bands made it clear that peace could not be
achieved until the United States abandoned
the Bozeman Trail forts and the soldiers had
left. Lasting only two days, the conferences at
North Platte accomplished little. The only
concession was the commissioners agreed to
supply those present with ammunition to aid
them on their fall hunt. Nevertheless, the commissioners persuaded them to return after their
hunt, sometime around the first of November,
hoping that would provide adequate time to
convince a delegation of the northern tribes
to come in. ls
As the Peace Commission made its way
toward Fort Larned, the president summoned
General Sherman to Washington, and in his
place appointed the long-whiskered and highly
competent Gen. Christopher C. Augur. Although Sherman would come and go throughout the life of the commission, Augur became
a full, acting member until the end. The
commission's path first took them to Fort
Harker, a small military post along the Smoky
Hill River in central Kansas. Here, nine newspaper reporters, a large military escort, and
thirty wagons containing goods for the upcoming council joined the commissioners. On
12 October, they arrived at Fort Larned, from
which they passed southward across the Arkansas River and made their way toward Medicine Lodge Creek, some seventy-five miles
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FIG. 2. Chief Red Cloud, Oglala Sioux, c. 18701880. Courtesy of the Denver Public Library,
Colorado Historical Society, and Denver Art
Museum, Denver, CO. Photograph No. X-31824.

distant. Known to the Indians as Timbered
Hill River, the site was a favorite Sun Dance
location for the Kiowa and a medicine lodge
still stood there from their 1866 ceremonythus the whites' name for the stream. 19 This
location had been chosen because the Cheyenne, still angered from General Hancock's
destruction of one of their villages earlier that
y~ar, refused to meet any closer to the forts
along the Arkansas River. 20
When the Peace Commission neared the
great encampment of the Southern Plains Indians, their numbers had increased to the formidable size of nearly 600 men and more than
1,200 animals. Yet, as they approached Medicine Lodge Creek, they could not help but be
impressed with what lay in front of themthousands of ponies and hundreds of lodges
belonging to the more than 5,000 Indians
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scattered throughout the valley.21 The councils began on 19 October with the Comanche,
Kiowa, Arapaho, and Kiowa-Apache, while
most of the Cheyenne remained camped some
forty miles distant along the Cimarron River.22
Senator Henderson opened the formal proceedings by pledging the commission's "sacred
honor" in correcting the wrongs performed by
the government and stating their intention of
making a lasting peace between the two
peoples. As the commissioners sat amidst the
grand council tent that had been erected for
this occasion, Senator Henderson proposed
the Great Father's wish to remove the Kiowa,
Comanche, and Kiowa-Apache to a reservation on the Red River and around the Wichita
Mountains. He explained that the United
States would provide them homes, schoolhouses, churches, teachers, agricultural implements, cattle, sheep, hogs, and other tools
needed to make the shift to "civilization."
Satanta, the great Kiowa leader, then rose to
speak. Complaining about the actions of white
soldiers, he professed his "love to roam over
the wide prairie" and his disgust with the
thought of living upon a reservation. Henry
M. Stanley, one of the news correspondents,
recorded that Satanta's bluntness "produced a
rather blank look upon the faces of the peace
commissioners." In similar fashion, and over
the course of the next two days, the commissioners listened as several chiefs and headmen
rose and expressed their wishes for peace while
also maintaining a desire to remain on the
lands of their fathers. 23
Despite the negative reactions to the prospect of reservation life, and more likely in
response to the large quantity of gifts brought
to the council, the Peace Commissioners concluded two separate treaties with the Kiowa,
Comanche, and Kiowa-Apache bands on 21
October. The treaties placed the bands on reservations in present-day Oklahoma where they
would receive a token amount of annual goods.
But more significantly, the treaties would force
some of the most powerful warrior-hunter societies into a foreign world of sedentary farming. As a reward for signing, the commissioners

gave them tens of thousands of dollars' worth
of goods. 24 During this time, Black Kettle, a
highly respected advocate of peace and one of
the few survivors of the Sand Creek Massacre,
along with some other Cheyenne approached
the commissioners and asked them to remain
for a few more days until those camped along
the Cimarron River would come in. Recognizing the importance in establishing peace with
the Cheyenne, and yet to the disgust of some
members of the Peace Commission, they
agreed to wait. 25
As the requested days came and went the
commissioners grew leery of the long delay.
Mounted with this agitation was the growing
concern among some members of the commission, along with the Kiowa and Comanche,
that violence would erupt when and if the
Cheyenne eventually decided to come.
Around noon on 27 October, loud shouts, rifle
fire, and the thunderous noise of galloping
ponies signaled the arrival of the Cheyenne
delegation. Dashing across Medicine Lodge
Creek within feet of the commissioners, their
impressive entrance exemplified the pride and
power that characterized the lives of these
nomadic warriors. As the chiefs and headmen
emerged in friendship, fears dissipated and they
agreed to hold a "Grand Council" the following day.26
As with the earlier treaty council, Senator
Henderson made the initiatory remarks. In his
speech he professed peace and the desire to
create a reservation south of Kansas and between the Arkansas and Cimarron Rivers
where the Cheyenne and Arapaho could live
without being molested by white settlers. After conversing with the principal chiefs, the
commissioners convinced them to sign a treaty
of peace. The commissioners then distributed
presents, along with some annuity goods that
had been detained since the proceeding spring,
throughout the ranks of the Cheyenne and
Arapaho tribes, which, as Stanley recorded,
"caused universal satisfaction to all parties."27
George Bent, a white trader and interpreter
married to Black Kettle's niece, was at the
treaty signing, and recognizing its significance,
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he later wrote that this was "the most important treaty ever signed by the Cheyenne," as it
"marked the beginning of the end" for these
people as free and independent warriors and
hunters.28
The treaties concluded along Medicine
Lodge Creek in October 1867 assigned the
Indians to two reservations within the western part of Indian Territory. This land was to
be held in common among the tribes, invalidating any cession of the lands without the
agreement of three-fourths of all the adult
males. In response to the commissioners' insistence that the Indians end their old way of
life and settle down to cultivate the land, the
treaties provided for farming implements,
buildings, mechanics' shops, clothing, and
other necessary goods that, in the minds of
the whites, would allow the Indians to move
closer to "civilized" life. The treaties promised annuity goods for a period of thirty years,
with the stipulation that war between the parties should forever cease. From statements
made during the councils, it appears likely that
the treaties might not have been signed had
not the commissioners agreed to give the Indians the right to hunt on any lands south of
the Arkansas as long as the buffalo existed in
such numbers as to justify the chase. 29
In hopes of procuring a council with Red
Cloud and the Lakota Sioux and Northern
Cheyenne, the commission immediately returned to the North Platte area and then
moved on to Fort Laramie. Upon arriving at
the fort the only Indians found waiting were
Crow. This was frustrating because the Crow
had a history of being friendly toward whites.
In the report filed by the commission the following winter, they expressed their regret in
their "failure" to procure a council with Red
Cloud and his leading warriors. They lamented
that had they had the opportunity, they did
"not for a moment doubt that a just and honorable peace could have been secured."30 Before leaving Fort Laramie, however, the
commissioners received word from the defiant
Lakota leader Red Cloud. He declared that
their war revolved around white intrusion into
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their last remaining hunting grounds along the
Powder River. He also assured the commission that once the government abandoned the
military forts in the Powder River country the
war would cease. Prior to departing, the commissioners sent word back to Red Cloud proposing a spring or summer meeting. With this
the commission dismissed until December,
when they were to reassemble in Washington
and draft a report of their proceedings for
Congress,3!
During the winter the commissioners reviewed their efforts, submitted a report to the
president, and made future plans to meet with
the northern bands in the spring. The report,
submitted to the president on 7 January 1868,
expressed in a sympathetic yet somewhat patronizing tone toward the Indians, outlined a
general history of their actions. Yet, the majority of the document described what they
understood to be the causes of the past fighting. The report mentioned the consequences
of the Chivington Massacre, the role of the
Powder River forts, the problems caused by
frontier settlers overrunning Indian lands, the
results of General Hancock's destruction of
the Cheyenne and Lakota Sioux village, and
other wrongs that instigated Indian aggression. It also pointed out that once the Indians
signed the treaties, promising government action and aid, war with these tribes ceased.32
In the concluding section of the report, the
commissioners expressed a strong desire for
the establishment of two districts of land where
the Indians could be introduced to agricultural implements that would allow them to
begin to abandon their nomadic ways and place
them on a path toward assimilation into the
white man's world. As the commissioners saw
it, by following their proposals the Indians
could become civilized in the short period of
twenty-five years. Therefore, the commissioners made an impassioned call for prompt congressional action in ratifying the provisions of
the treaties. 33
The tone of this document, along with
numerous suggestions of doing "good to them
that hate us," have led one scholar to conclude
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FIG. 3. General William T. Sherman and commissioners in council with Indian chiefs at Ft. Laramie, Wyoming,
c. 1867-1868. Photographer, Alexander Gardner, Office of the Chief Signal Officer. National Archives at
College Park, MD. Photograph no. NWDNS-lll-SC-95986.

that this must have been written by Commissioner Taylor, who then persuaded the generals to sign it. As a former preacher, Taylor had
been schooled in biblical thought, and the
sympathy for the Indian warriors expressed in
this report speaks contrary to the philosophies
of military men like General Sherman. Nevertheless, despite advocating a policy of kindness, the report contained the signatures of all
the commissioners.34
As the commissioners hoped to engage the
northern tribes in the spring, they sent out
various so-called "chief-catchers" who worked
throughout the late winter and early spring in
efforts to convince the Lakota Sioux leaders
to come to Fort Laramie for an April council. 35 With this in mind, the January report
also suggested moving the Bozeman Trail route
to Montana west of the Bighorn Mountains,
thereby relinquishing the need for the Powder

River forts and appeasing the Lakota Sioux
and Northern Cheyenne. As winter continued, the government soon became convinced
that something had to be done to end the
bloodshed along the Powder River. Red Cloud,
whose physical characteristics matched his
prowess and unwavering leadership, now commanded the respect and attention of the US
government. Consequently, on 2 March, Gen.
Ulysses S. Grant wrote to General Sherman,
"I think it will be well to prepare at once for
the abandonment of the posts, Phil Kearny,
Reno and Fetterman and to make all the capital with the Indians that can be made out of
the change."36 For the only time in history,
the US army was giving in to the demands of
a "hostile" Indian leader.
In early spring the commissioners once
again headed toward Fort Laramie. Arriving
in Omaha, Nebraska, in early April, Sherman
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FIG. 4. Indian Peace Commission, c. 1868. Courtesy of Denver Public Library, Colorado Historical
Society, and Denver Art Museum, Denver, CO. Photograph no. X-32463.

received orders to immediately return to Washington and testify in President Johnson's impeachment trial. Prior to his departure, the
militarily minded leader strongly admonished
the commission to proceed with its previous
intentions of placing the northern tribes on
one large reservation, while also being cautious about giving arms and ammunition to
those tribes currently residing off the designated reservation area. As well, he pointed
out the importance in settling questions that
had arisen regarding the Navajo Indians, recommending that the solution to their problems would come from removing them to
Indian Territory near the Red RiverY
Once again, Fort Laramie proved disappointing. Greeting them was the familiar Brule
leader Spotted Tail, but Red Cloud and his
followers were nowhere to be found. There
was some hope-granted, a small one-that

they would come in toward the end of the
month. The commissioners had arrived prepared to submit to all of Red Cloud's untelenting demands, specifically the abandonment
and closure of the Bozeman Trail and the granting of hunting rights along the Republican
River. After waiting only a short time, however, they decided to hold a preliminary council with the Brule on 13 April, outlining treaty
stipul~tions that defined a reservation designed
to concentrate the northern tribes on a large
tract of land encompassing nearly all of
present-day South Dakota west of the Missouri River. Agencies would be built along the
Missouri River where the government could
easily access them by river travel, although
the Lakota Sioux would later use this as an
argument against the government, proclaiming that this was simply a tactic to force them
into moving to an area where they had no
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desire to live. Along with granting hunting
rights on the Republican River, the treaty set
aside the country north of the North Platte
River and east of the Big Horn Mountains as
"unceded Indian territory," forbidding white
people from settling upon it. The remainder
of the treaty was similar to those signed during
the Medicine Lodge councils the proceeding
year, calling for farming implements and other
tools that would aid them in moving closer to
the white man's way of life. 38
With no sign of Red Cloud, the commissioners convinced the Brule Sioux to sign the
treaty on 29 April. After that, they held a
council with some Crow who arrived at Fort
Laramie during the first week of May. The
commissioners had prepared a treaty for them
to sign granting them country within Montana Territory and carrying wi th it the characteristic conditions and annuities promised in
the other treaties. On 7 May the headmen of
the tribe placed their marks in agreement.
They also concluded another treaty on 10 May
with the Northern Cheyenne and Northern
Arapaho, granting them the choice of living
on the lands given to their southern relatives
as a result of the treaty of Medicine Lodge or
with the Lakota Sioux in the north. 39
Although by the first of May news had
reached Red Cloud of the army's decision to
abandon the Bozeman Trail, he reportedly sent
word to the commissioners telling them "when
we see the soldiers moving away and the forts
abandoned, then I will come down and talk."40
This information spread serious doubts
throughout the commission whether they
could get the remaining Lakota Sioux to sign
the treaty. With this in mind, and not wanting to sit around indefinitely, the commissioners agreed to divide into four parties: General
Alfred Terry would proceed to Fort Randall
and Fort Sully to provide for the Indians "en
route to the reservation"; General Augur would
go to Fort Bridger to establish treaties with
the Snake, Bannock, and other Indians residing along railroad lines in Utah; General
Sherman and Samuel Tappan would hold a
council with the Navajos; and General Harney

and John Sanborn would stay at Fort Laramie
and conclude treaties with the Lakota Sioux
Indians and then proceed up the Missouri
River, join General Terry, and convince the
Indians near Fort Sully and Fort Rice to place
their marks on the same Fort Laramie Treaty.41
At Fort Laramie, Harney and Sanborn were
the first to meet success. On 25 and 26 May
some Oglala, Miniconjou, and Yanktonai
Sioux came and signed the treaty. A short
time later, the two commissioners carried the
Fort Laramie Treaty up the Missouri River
and joined General Terry at Fort Rice. Aided
this time by Father Pierre-Jean DeSmet, known
throughout Indian country as "Black Robe"
because of his Jesuit background, a party of
Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, and Yanktonai, including the famous leader Sitting Bull, assembled
on 2 July. In reality, there would not be any
discussions about the treaty stipulations. The
three commissioners planned on having the
Fort Laramie treaty read, allowing some time
for the chiefs to speak, and then instructing
them to place their marks on the prepared
document. These proceedings, as historian
Robert Utley has pointed out, "dramatized the
fantasy world in which Indian treaties were
concocted."42 These tribes had little interest
in or understanding of what had taken place
at the Fort Laramie councils. They wanted the
whites out of their country and would fight as
long as necessary. An important opponent of
the treaty was Chief Gall, one of the most
bold and aggressive leaders in the Sioux
Nation's fight against unwanted white aggression. His impressive physical strength, combined with his bravery and determination,
made him a formidable leader of his people.
Nevertheless, the council went as planned,
and despite the prophetic statements by Gall
that "if we make peace, you will not hold it,"
the chiefs placed their marks on the treaty.43
Meanwhile, in late May, General Sherman,
who had returned from Washington at the time
the commission agreed to disperse, and Samuel
Tappan met with the Navajo at the Bosque
Redondo in eastern New Mexico. In 1864 the
government forcibly removed the Navajo to
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this remote and desolate location in an effort
to make them agriculturalists and prevent further raiding into the New Mexico settlements.
In one of the most tragic episodes of Indian
exile in US history, Colonel Kit Carson
rounded up 8,000 Navajos and forced them to
walk more than 350 miles from northeastern
Arizona and northwestern New Mexico to
Bosque Redondo, a desolate tract on the Pecos
River in eastern New Mexico. More than 3,000
people died either by starvation, freezing to
death, succumbed to sickness or were shot by
soldiers during the tragic years of what the
Navajo called "The Long Walk." Bosque
Redondo was supposed to demonstrate the
feasibility of the reservation system, yet it
was a dismal failure and the Navajo wanted
desperately to return to their homeland.
Sherman initiated talks on 28 May at Fort
Sumner. He began by informing them he had
come for the purpose of learning about their
condition and what could be done for them.
Barboncito, designated by Sherman as the head
chief of the Navajo, then talked at length. He
related the extent and depth of their sufferings during the past four years. Numerous
peopled had died, many were currently ill, and
despite their efforts to cultivate the land the
soil simply failed to yield-all graphically displayed by their current state of poverty. Afterward, Sherman explained that there was land
within "Indian Territory" south of the Arkansas River where they could send a delegation
to decide if they wanted this for their reservation. If their desire was to return home, however, the government would draw a boundary
and the Navajo would not be allowed to cross
that line except to trade. Without hesitation
Barboncito responded to Sherman, saying that
"we do not want to go to the right or left but
straight back to our own country."44
Consequently, on 1 June 1868 Sherman and
Tappan presented the Navajo with a treaty
which, in the words of one scholar, "gave the
Navajo a new beginning."45 It allowed them to
leave the Bosque Redondo reservation while
establishing strict boundaries within their old
homeland. It also called for the creation of an
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agency consisting of a warehouse, carpenter
shop, blacksmith shop, schoolhouse, chapel,
and a home for an agent. It ordered children
to attend school and learn English "in order to
insure the civilization of the Indians entering
into this treaty." And like the Medicine Lodge
treaties and Fort Laramie Treaty, the Navajo
would be given the necessary farming implements to make them self-supporting and "civilized." After listening to the treaty stipulations,
Barboncito led the other chiefs and headmen
in placing their marks upon the document,
following which they immediately began
preparations for removing to their homeland. 46
While all of this was happening, General
Augur traveled west to Fort Bridger in presentday southwestern Wyoming. The Eastern
Shoshone and Bannock were currently at peace
with the whites, and as Augur explained when
he began negotiations, it was the government's
desire to "arrange matters that there may never
hereafter be cause of war between them." In
truth, this meant that Augur intended to place
the Indians on permanent reservations where
they would not interfere with the expanding
railroad lines. On 3 July 1868 they signed a
treaty that placed the Eastern Shoshone on a
reservation in the Wind River country and
stipulated that the Bannock be located somewhere near the mouth of the Portneuf River,
with detailed boundaries to be designated at a
later time. True to form, the provisions within
this treaty were almost identical to the other
treaties made by the Peace Commission during the previous two yearsY
Along the Bozeman Trail, the abandonment of the Powder River forts proved to be a
slow, drawn-out process lasting throughout
much of the summer. As a result of frustrating
attempts to negotiate the sale of the forts' goods
to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the public,
it was not until 29 July that the troops at Fort
C. F. Smith marched away for the last time.
Early the next morning Red Cloud and his
warriors, who had watched from a distance
the activities of the preceding day, triumphantly rode into the fort and burned it to the
ground. By the first of August, Fort Phil Kearny
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had suffered a similar fate and Fort Reno had
been abandoned, making it appear the time
had come to make peace. Red Cloud, however, still failed to come in, and attacks continued throughout the month of September. 48
The commission reunited in Chicago during the early days of October. Overall, aside
from some bands of Lakota Sioux, the commissioners concluded treaties of peace with
most of the Indian tribes east of the Rocky
Mountains and west of the Mississippi River,
and they still hoped Red Cloud would place
his mark on the treaty before the end of the
year. 49 Nonetheless, war had once again returned to the Southern Plains, as stipulations
within the Medicine Lodge treaties were going unfulfilled. As it was not considered worthwhile for the commissioners to continue efforts
to bring in Red Cloud, all that was left for
them was to submit a final report representing
their considerations of the existing situation
of Indian affairs.
President Johnson's impeachment proceedings continued to detain Senator Henderson,
so the remaining seven members drafted the
final report. First, they recommended that
Congress consider the treaties made by the
commission to be in full force regardless of
whether they had been ratified. Next, they
urged Congress to provide provisions for those
tribes who had been or would be located permanently on their respective reservations. One
of the most important recommendations came
from General Terry, regarding the future process of Indian negotiations. He suggested from
this point on the government "cease to recognize the Indian tribes as domestic dependent
nations," and that in the future no more "treaties shall be made with any Indian tribe," forcing the Indians into being personally subject
to the laws of the United States. With bloodshed once again encompassing the Southern
Plains, Congress needed to reconsider whether
treaty making was the proper method of doing
business with the Indians. 5o
Essentially, the commissioners all agreed
on the first section of the report; however, the
last portion strongly represented the feelings

of the military officers and particularly General Sherman. In light of the depredations
currently being committed by the Southern
Plains Indians, the commissioners called for
military force to compel the Indians to go to
their reservations and further recommended
that they should no longer be permitted to
hunt outside their reservation boundaries.
And, despite strong opposition from Commissioner Taylor, they voted to recommend the
transfer of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the
War Department. Sherman had long believed
that by giving the War Department control
over Indian Affairs the army could act more
efficiently, giving them greater power to end
the fighting between the whites and Indians.
With this completed on 10 October, the Peace
Commission disbanded, never to meet again,
ending the last great effort by the US government to make treaties with the IndiansY
After the Peace Commission dissolved, and
following a successful fall hunt, the Lakota
Sioux, led by the confident Red Cloud and a
large delegation of approximately 125 of his
warriors, came into Fort Laramie for a conference. The commissioners had left a copy of
the treaty at the fort, and the post commander,
Maj. William Dye, had been given authority
to represent the Peace Commission. The government wished to have Red Cloud's mark
upon the already prepared treaty, and consequently they were not willing to negotiate.
Finally, after a two-day council, and with a
show of reluctance, Red Cloud reportedly
"washed his hands with the dust of the floor"
and signed the document. Although Major Dye
came away apprehensive about the prospect
of lasting peace, the government had at last
obtained the long-awaited end to Red Cloud's
War. 52
Although the Indians had placed their
marks on the treaties, Congress still had to
ratify them and appropriate the necessary funds
to carry out their provisions. One of the problems of treaty making existed with Congress's
failure to support treaty commissioners' actions in the field. The nineteenth century is
replete with instances when, for one reason or
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another, Congress either rejected treaties or
their stipulations went unfulfilled. 53 Aware of
this, the reports and letters of the Peace Commission continually demanded that Congress
act swiftly in ratifying the treaties and appropriating the necessary funds to fulfill them.
One such example came from Commissioner
Taylor during the summer of 1868. Writing to
O. H. Browning, acting secretary of the interior, Taylor recounted the Lakota Sioux treaties from that year and implored the secretary
that "if peace is to be preserved," then "speedy
action in appropriating the funds necessary to
care for and feed the most destitute is absolutely necessary."54
"The prime object of the government in
the pacific policy pursued by its commissioners," wrote General William S. Harney on 23
November 1868, "has been to secure and preserve peaceful relations with our Indian tribes."
As he saw it, "to secure perpetual peace with
the Sioux Indians it is only necessary to fulfill
the terms of the treaty made by the peace commissioners."55 Later that year, acting on his
own accord in an effort to begin fulfilling the
government's obligations, General Harney
purchased articles of food, agricultural implements, building materials, and other articles
necessary for the establishment of agencies and
the support of the Lakota Sioux throughout
the winter. Although Congress later forced
Harney to account for his actions, General
Sherman recognized the importance of keeping peace and supported the unauthorized expenditures. Nevertheless, the extended debates
that accompanied Congress's delay in appropriating the necessary funds needed to fulfill
the treaty stipulations brought discouragement and shame to those men instructed to
deal with the Indians. Coupled with the
government's legacy of broken promises, the
problem of gaining congressional support for
the 1867 and 1868 treaties caused added problems among a people who already had reason
enough to distrust the white man. 56
While Harney tried to fulfill the Fort
Laramie Treaty, the military decided to punish the Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho for
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supposed breeches in their treaty agreements.
In the Southern Plains, annuity goods had been
slow to arrive, with some even being withheld
from the Cheyenne as a result of a raid on the
Kaw. Angered and frustrated with the actions
of the government, a Cheyenne raiding party
headed out toward the Pawnee. When they
returned in August, fifteen white men had been
killed, and war once again spread across the
Southern Plains. The following month a party
of fifty scouts under the ambitious Maj. George
A. Forsyth fought for their lives on the banks
of a small island within the Arikara Fork of
the Republican River in what has come to be
called the Battle of Beecher's Island. Then on
27 November 1868, Lt. Col. George A. Custer
tested the effectiveness of the army's new
policy of winter campaigns as he attacked and
destroyed Black Kettle's Cheyenne camp along
the Washita River. Thus, by the end of the
year, the Medicine Lodge treaties had done
little to bring peace to the Southern Plains. 57
Regarding the Lakota Sioux treaties, it appears that in large measure the Indians did not
learn the full content of the Fort Laramie
Treaty until Red Cloud returned from Washington in 1870; had they understood that the
government expected them to take up a life of
farming near the agencies along the Missouri
River, they might never have consented. 58
Nevertheless, for all intents and purposes the
Fort Laramie Treaty proved to be the most
lasting and significant at the time, as it successfully ended Red Cloud's War. Despite those
Indians who refused to settle on the reservation, the treaty placed Red Cloud in a situation where, as Robert Utley has pointed out,
he became "a maddeningly disruptive influence for the next forty-one years, [butl never
again took the warpath."59
Because war existed on the Southern Plains
when the commission dissolved in October
1868, their activities have often been viewed
as a failure. Yet in the end, the Peace Commission left a large legacy. Many of the changes
within federal Indian policy following 1868
can be traced in one form or another to the
ideas or recommendations brought forth by
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the commissioners. For example, Francis Paul
Prucha has demonstrated that the reports of
the peace commissioners "gave new impetus
to reformers interested in the Indians" and
spurred new interest in those promoting a
Christian approach to Indian policy.60 The
development of President Grant's celebrated
"Peace Policy" advocating concentration, education, and civilization, along with the creation of a Board ofIndian Commissioners, also
profited greatly from the two reports made by
the Peace Commission. 61 The end of treaty
making with the Indians in 1871 can be traced
to ideas present within the final report of the
commission. In fact, aside from a treaty made
with the Nez Perce in late 1868, the Peace
Commission was the last authorized group sent
out by the government to conclude treaties
with the Indian tribes of the United States. 62
As well, the issue of transferring the Bureau of
Indian Affairs to the War Department, recommended by the commissioners in their final report, became a major issue for more than
a decade. 63
The final sentiments of the Peace Commission supported General Sherman's intent to
increase military control in the West. Sherman
firmly believed in using military force to end
Indian conflicts, a fact largely illustrated by
the actions of Custer on the Washita River
not even two months after the commissioners
issued their report. Although Sherman was
not opposed to the policies of peace prescribed
for the Indians, he understood the persuasive
power of military might. In his annual report
for 1868 he remarked on this policy as a "double
process of peace within their reservations and
war without." He further intended to "prosecute the war with vindictive earnestness
against all hostile Indians, till they are obliterated or beg for mercy; and therefore all who
want peace must get out of the theatre of war. "64
This philosophy of war against those Indians
residing outside their reservations quickly became the driving force behind Indian policy
throughout the next decade, and in many ways
must be viewed as the most lasting and ironic
result of the Peace Commission. 65
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